In this major new assessment of Hannah Arendt's writings on International Relations Patricia Owens provides a compelling case for Arendt's continued relevance to debates about suicide bombing; genocide; the ethics of war; civilian casualties; and the dangers of lies and hypocrisy in wartime.

Boundary crossings in academia are rarely addressed by university policy despite the risk of problematic or unethical faculty - student interactions. This study contributes to an understanding of undergraduate college student perceptions of appropriateness of faculty - student nonsexual interactions by investigating the influence of gender and ethnicity on student judgments of the appropriateness of numerous hypothetical interactions. Overall, students deemed the majority of interactions as inappropriate. Female students judged a number of interactions as more inappropriate than did male students, (...) and with a few exceptions, Mexican American and Anglo American students were similar in their ratings of the appropriateness of faculty - student interactions. These findings suggest that universities need to be proactive in establishing guidelines concerning faculty-student boundary crossings. (shrink)

Human concern over the urgency of current environmental issues increasingly entails wide-ranging discussions of how we may rethink the relationship between humans and the rest of the natural world. In order to provide a context for such discussions this anthology provides a selection of some of the most important, interesting and influential readings on the subject from classical times through to the late nineteenth century. Included are such figures as Xenophon, Plato, Aristotle, Hildegard of Bingen, St Francis of Assisi, Bacon, (...) Decartes, Kant, Mill, Emerson and Thoreau. As the collection as a whole amply demonstrates, the history of western philosophical accounts of nature can help us to better understand current attitudes and problems. Human Life and the Natural World may also be of interest to a broad range of philosophers and students of philosophy, and more generally to those with a concern for the environment that engages the intellect as well as the heart. (shrink)

We study the Johansen–Ledoit–Sornette model of financial market crashes :219–255, 2000). On our view, the JLS model is a curious case from the perspective of the recent philosophy of science literature, as it is naturally construed as a “minimal model” in the sense of Batterman and Rice :349–376, 2014) that nonetheless provides a causal explanation of market crashes, in the sense of Woodward’s interventionist account of causation.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The God of Faith and the God of the Philosophers:A Contribution to the Problem of the Theologia Naturalis*Joseph RatzingerTranslated by Patricia PintadoPreface to the 1960 EditionThe remarks that I hereby present to the public consist in the reproduction of the inaugural lecture I gave on June 24, 1959, on the occasion of my appointment to the Chair of Fundamental Theology of the Catholic Faculty of Theology at the (...) University of Bonn. Several notes have been added to the unchanged text of the lecture to provide scholarly justification for what has been said. The aim of my remarks was to illuminate the problematic background of a word that is unfortunately all too worn out and to get to the bottom of a question that is of great importance both for the inner orientation of Catholic theology and for the dialogue between the denominations.I dedicate these lines to the memory of my father, who accompanied all my work with his caring sympathy until last August, when he was unexpectedly called from this world. As with my book on Bonaventure, I have to thank Schnell and Steiner publishing house for their cooperation that made it possible to print in this form.Bad Godesberg, Feast of St. Thomas Aquinas, 1960. [End Page 1013]New Preface to the New Edition in 2004Almost half a century has passed since I gave the Bonn inaugural lecture in June of 1959. During this time, history has moved faster than ever before. To the dramatic upheavals in society, politics, science, and culture correspond also profound breakthroughs in philosophy and theology. Can a text from back then still be current even today? When I reread this lecture, which in the meantime had been published once again by my circle of students in a volume with texts written over the course of four decades,1 only then did I become fully aware of how much the questions posed back then have remained until today guidelines for my thinking. These questions recur in my Introduction to Christianity (1968), but especially in the lecture I gave at the Sorbonne in Paris entitled "Christianity—the True Religion?"2 Naturally, the lecture was modified and reshaped by each of the new contexts.What remains today, and what will be tomorrow a central task of theological thinking, is in any case the twofold question around which the considerations of the Bonn lecture revolved. There is first the general question of the relationship between faith and reason: what kind of rationality is appropriate for the Christian faith? How does faith fit into the whole of our existence? Is faith reconcilable with the fundamental insights that modern reason has acquired? Does the faith respond to reasonable questions and is its "reason" communicable? This fundamental problem inside our faith and theology becomes concrete as a question: Was the consummate connection in the nascent Church between Greek thought and biblical faith lawful, so that this relation belongs to "the essence of Christianity," or was it a "disastrous misunderstanding" from which we must finally liberate ourselves? Today, where Christianity in the West resolutely wishes to assimilate into other cultural spheres, stepping out of the Western world, this question has become an extremely urgent problem; this is also a fundamental problem in the conversation between Catholic and Orthodox Christianity on the one hand, and between the Protestant theological thought, on the other hand, which from the beginning critiqued the merger of metaphysics and faith, of Greek thought and biblical tradition. So, it appears to me that the attempt then to rewrite the foundational problems of fundamental theology, which [End Page 1014] I dared at the beginning of my theological work, can also today provide an impetus to theological thought, in order—in our own context—to satisfy our obligation to give an answer to those who ask about the Logos—the reason—for our hope (1 Pet 3:15).I give my heartfelt thanks to the publishing house for the initiative to reprint this small text, and likewise to my third successor as chair of Fundamental Theology in Bonn, Prof. Dr. Heino Sonnemans, for his friendly cooperation in this project.Rome, Feast of Saints Peter... (shrink)

Owen Barfield--philosopher, author, poet, and critic--was a founding member of the Inklings, the private Oxford society that included the leading literary figures C.S. Lewis, J.R.R. Tolkien, and Charles Williams. Lewis, who was greatly affected by Barfield during their long friendship, wrote of their many heated debates: "I think he changed me a good deal more than I him." Simon Blaxland-de Lange's biography (the first to be published on Owen Barfield) was written with the active cooperation of Barfield himself (...) who, before his death in 1997, gave numerous interviews to the author and shared many of his papers and manuscripts. The fruit of this collaboration is a book that penetrates deeply into the life and thought of one of the most important figures of the twentieth century. It studies two pf Barfield's influences--the Romantic poet Coleridge and the philosopher Rudolf Steiner--and elaborates on his profound personal connection with C.S. Lewis. This biography also features a sketch in his own words (based on interviews with the author), describing Barfield's strong relationship with North America and his two professions as lawyer and writer. This updated edition features important new material, including Owen Barfield's own "Psychography" (1948) and four pages of color plates. (shrink)

Critics take issue with Arendt’s writings on the question of race in the United States, especially in On Violence [1970] and her controversial essays on school desegregation and education “Reflections on Little Rock” [1959] and “The Crisis in Education” [1958]. Recent works, such as that of Kathryn Sophia Belle, Patricia Owens, and Chad Kautzer, call to reevaluate Arendt’s canonical status through the lens of her anti-Black racism and warns that her thought sanctions state violence against racial groups. Anne Norton (...) and Robert Bernasconi argued before against Arendt’s failure to acknowledge Black agency and thought and how anti-Black racism structures the political realm in American society. While I agree with these critiques about Arendt’s shortsighted and questionable judgments, I find in her writings on guilt and political responsibility a resource to think resistance to anti-Black racism. This is not an obvious claim as the literature on Arendt’s notion of political responsibility focuses mainly on her writings about post-war Germany and the controversy following the publication of Eichmann in Jerusalem [1963] rather than her controversial writings on race and racism in the US. Yet we can find this connection in Arendt’s writing when she questions “white guilt” as an instance of collective guilt in On Violence (64-65) or when she criticizes in “Reflections” the abandonment of responsibility in its two senses: the responsibility to protect the children and the responsibility for the world (50). In the following I explain the relevance of political responsibility to confronting structural and historical racial injustices. I address critiques about the asymmetrical burden of responsibility and white ignorance and show support for the constructive, actional, backward- and forward-looking dimensions of political responsibility in the visions and platforms of the Movement for Black Lives. (shrink)

In this essay we provide (1) an argument for why ethics should be naturalized, (2) an analysis of why it is not yet naturalized, (3) a defense of ethical naturalism against two fallacies—Hume’s and Moore’s—that ethical naturalism allegedly commits, and (4) a proposal that normative ethics is best conceived as part of human ecology committed to pluralistic relativism. We explain why naturalizing ethics both entails relativism and also constrains it, and why nihilism about value is not an especially worrisome for (...) ethical naturalists. The substantive view we put forth constitutes the essence of Duke Naturalism. (shrink)

Despite Kant’s lasting influence on philosophical accounts of moral motivation, many details of his own position remain elusive. In the Critique of Practical Reason, for example, Kant argues that our recognition of the moral law’s authority must elicit both painful and pleasurable feelings in us. On reflection, however, it is unclear how these effects could motivate us to act from duty. As a result, Kant’s theory of moral sensibility comes under a skeptical threat: the possibility of a morally motivating feeling (...) seems incoherent. My aim in this paper is to reconstruct Kant’s theory in a way that overcomes this threat. By way of conclusion, I show how my reconstruction brings a new perspective to a long-standing dispute over intellectualist and affectivist views of moral motivation. (shrink)

The following suggestions for the interpretation of Parmenides and Melissus can be grouped for convenience about one problem. This is the problem whether, as Aristotle thought and as most commentators still assume, Parmenides wrote his poem in the broad tradition of Ionian and Italian cosmology. The details of Aristotle's interpretation have been challenged over and again, but those who agree with his general assumptions take comfort from some or all of the following major arguments. First, the cosmogony which formed the (...) last part of Parmenides' poem is expressly claimed by the goddess who expounds it to have some measure of truth or reliability in its own right, and indeed the very greatest measure possible for such an attempt. Second, the earlier arguments of the goddess prepare the ground for such a cosmogony in two ways. For in the first place these arguments themselves start from assumptions derived from earlier cosmologists, and are concerned merely to work out the implications of this traditional material. And, in the second place, they end by establishing the existence of a spherical universe: the framework of the physical world can be secured by logic even if the subsequent introduction of sensible qualities or ‘powers’ into this world marks some decline in logical rigour. (shrink)

Kant’s effort to defend the co-existence of transcendental freedom and natural necessity is one of the crowning achievements of the first Critique. Yet by identifying the will with practical reason in his moral philosophy, he lent support to the view that the moral law is the causal law of a free will – the result of which, as Reinhold argued, left immoral action impossible. However, Reinhold’s attempt to separate the will from practical reason generated difficulties of its own, which Maimon (...) was quick to point out. By identifying freedom with indifferent choice, Maimon argued, Reinhold had no resources to explain why a free will acts at all. My aim in this article is to show how Fichte’s theory of freedom seeks to reconcile these two commitments: the key lies in what I call Fichte’s Genetic Model, according to which indifferent choice is the original condition of the will, but a condition we must actively overcome. (shrink)

It is now nearly axiomatic among Platonic scholars that the Timaeus and its unfinished sequel the Critias belong to the last stage of Plato's writings. The Laws is generally held to be wholly or partly a later production. So, by many, is the Philebus, but that is all. Perhaps the privileged status of the Timaeus in the Middle Ages helped to fix the conviction that it embodies Plato's maturest theories.

Some statements couched in the present tense have no reference to time. They are, if you like, grammatically tensed but logically tenseless. Mathematical statements such as ‘twice two is four’ or ‘there is a prime number between 125 and 128’ are of this sort. So is the statement I have just made. To ask in good faith whether there is still the prime number there used to be between 125 and 128 would be to show that one did not understand (...) the use of such statements, and so would any attempt to answer the question. It is tempting to take another step and talk of such timeless statements as statements about timeless entities. If the number 4 neither continues nor ceases to be twice two this is, surely, because the number 4 has no history of any kind, not even the being a day older today than yesterday. Other timeless statements might shake our confidence in this inference: ‘clocks are devices for measuring time’ is a timeless statement, but it is not about a class of timeless clocks. But, given a preoccupation with a favoured set of examples and a stage of thought at which men did not distinguish the properties of statements from the properties of the things they are about, we can expect timeless entities to appear as the natural proxies of timeless statements. (shrink)

With the waves of reform occurring in mental health legislation in England and other jurisdictions, mental capacity is set to become a key medico-legal concept. The concept is central to the law of informed consent and is closely aligned to the philosophical concept of autonomy. It is also closely related to mental disorder. This paper explores the interdisciplinary terrain where mental capacity is located. Our aim is to identify core dilemmas and to suggest pathways for future interdisciplinary research. The terrain (...) can be separated into three types of discussion: philosophical, legal and psychiatric. Each discussion approaches mental capacity and judgmental autonomy from a different perspective yet each discussion struggles over two key dilemmas: whether mental capacity and autonomy is/should be a moral or a psychological notion and whether rationality is the key constitutive factor. We suggest that further theoretical work will have to be interdisciplinary and that this work offers an opportunity for the law to enrich its interpretation of mental capacity, for psychiatry to clarify the normative elements latent in its concepts and for philosophy to advance understanding of autonomy through the study of decisional dysfunction. The new pressures on medical and legal practice to be more explicit about mental capacity make this work a priority. (shrink)

A leading contemporary theory of consciousness in theoretical neuroscience apparently shares significant common ground with a philosophical system of thought from Antiquity. Although chronologically disparate, the integrated information theory of consciousness and Aristotelian metaphysics seem to be akin with regards to fundamental ontology, epistemic priority, and causal powers. In this article, I explore these areas of common ground. Additionally, I consider an apparent dissimilarity regarding panpsychism and suggest that an Aristotelian understanding of powers provides a natural way for IIT to (...) reasonably regulate its ascription of consciousness. (shrink)

E. L. Grant Watson, an English field naturalist, zoologist, and one of England's best-loved nature writers, spent a lifetime trying to bring nature and consciousness into a unified, holistic vision that would establish meaning in the world without losing wonder. The questions raised by facts of nature inexplicable in terms of conventional theories, together with insights gained from a reading of Jung--as well as by a study of early Christian gnostic literature and the anthroposophy of Rudolf Steiner--brought him to (...) an imaginative perception of living things based on the conviction of the presence in all things of a spiritual reality. "Love is of man, but wisdom is of nature, and there are times when it almost seems that the author's secret--as perhaps it will one day be the secret of a reformed scientific method--is to stand aside and let the wisdom of nature herself speak through him. "-Owen Barfield. (shrink)

Is there any sense to the idea of an ``ought''''that is not relative to any particularnormative framework? This ``ought'''' would not bea moral, prudential, legal, aesthetic, orreligious ``ought,'''' but rather an unqualified or just plain ``ought.'''' Thispaper (i) argues for the existence andusefulness of just plain ``ought''''; (ii) locatesthe concept of just plain ``ought'''' within amajor strand in the history of ethics (namely,the perennial attempt to demonstrate thatmorality and prudence are in harmony); and(iii) challenges David Copp''s recent attempt toshow that (...) in fact there is no such thing asjust plain ``ought.'''' A theory of just plain``ought'''' emerges along the way. (shrink)

Studies have shown that some covertly conscious brain-injured patients, who are behaviorally unresponsive, can reply to simple questions via neuronal responses. Given the possibility of such neuronal responses, Andrew Peterson et al. have argued that there is warrant for some covertly conscious patients being included in low-stakes medical decisions using neuronal responses, which could protect and enhance their autonomy. The justification for giving credence to alleged neuronal responses must be analyzed from various perspectives, including neurology, bioethics, law, and as we (...) suggest, philosophy of mind. In this article, we analyze the warrant for giving credence to neuronal responses from two different views in philosophy of mind. We consider how nonreductive physicalism’s causal exclusion problem elicits doubt about interpreting neural activity as indicating a conscious response. By contrast, such an interpretation is supported by the mind-body powers model of neural correlates of consciousness inspired by hylomorphism. (shrink)

Written in a clear and engaging style, this text demonstrates Nietzsche's significance as a philosopher and as a political theorist by highlighting his critique of liberalism (in both its philosophical and political forms) and by elaborating the form of ethical and political understanding which his philosophy discloses.

It is often thought that contemporary neuroscience provides strong evidence for physicalism that nullifies dualism. The principal data is neural correlates of consciousness (for brevity NCC). In this chapter I argue that NCC are neutral vis- à-vis physicalist and dualist views of the mind. First I clarify what NCC are and how neuroscientists identify them. Subsequently I discuss what NCC entail and highlight the need for philosophical argumentation in order to conclude that physicalism is true by appealing to NCC. Lastly, (...) the simplicity argument for physicalism that appeals to NCC is presented, analyzed, and found wanting. (shrink)

The Preface to my book, Kant's Justification of Ethics.

This paper addresses republican conditions of legitimacy for the constitution of the civic statuses of migrants. It identifies two legitimacy tests to which any civic status is subject, namely, that it does not make its bearers more vulnerable to the arbitrary exercise of private or public power and that the constitution of the person as bearer of this status is not itself the product of an arbitrary exercise of public power . It is argued that R1 puts significant constraints on (...) what can be legitimate migrant statuses and R2 links republicanism to cosmopolitanism in terms of a basic norm in respect of the production and allocation of civic statuses in that those who are subject to such a regime should have the effective power to ‘shape and contest’ the rules of this regime. (shrink)

Just as humans can draw conclusions responsibly or irresponsibly, so too can computers. Machine learning systems that have been trained on data sets that include irresponsible judgments are likely to yield irresponsible predictions as outputs. In this paper I focus on a particular kind of inference a computer system might make: identification of the intentions with which a person acted on the basis of photographic evidence. Such inferences are liable to be morally objectionable, because of a way in which they (...) are presumptuous. After elaborating this moral concern, I explore the possibility that carefully procuring the training data for image recognition systems could ensure that the systems avoid the problem. The lesson of this paper extends beyond just the particular case of image recognition systems and the challenge of responsibly identifying a person’s intentions. Reflection on this particular case demonstrates the importance (as well as the difficulty) of evaluating machine learning systems and their training data from the standpoint of moral considerations that are not encompassed by ordinary assessments of predictive accuracy. (shrink)

This article argues that the practical difficulties and normative dilemmas at stake in the European refugee crisis as a crisis of EU integration extend beyond refugee policies into what we may call ‘the citizenship regime’ of the European Union in ways that are consequential for refugees, member states, and the European Union. It advances arguments for the relatively rapid access to citizenship of refugees, demonstrates that this norm has at least some acknowledgment in the policies of EU member states and (...) considers what further differentiation of refugees from other classes of migrant might be a part of developing a just and legitimate Common European Asylum Regime. It argues that there are some reasons to favour a CEAS in which refugees receive EU citizenship prior to national citizenship in a member state. (shrink)

This volume offers a rich and accessible introduction to contemporary research on Buddhist ethical thought for interested students and scholars, yet also offers chapters taking up more technical philosophical and textual topics. A Mirror is For Reflection offers a snapshot of the present state of academic investigation into the nature of Buddhist Ethics, including contributions from many of the leading figures in the academic study of Buddhist philosophy. Over the past decade many scholars have come to think that the project (...) of fitting Buddhist ethical thought into Western philosophical categories may be of limited utility, and the focus of investigation has shifted in a number of new directions. This volume includes contemporary perspectives on topics including the nature of Buddhist ethics as a whole, karma and rebirth, mindfulness, narrative, intention, free will, politics, anger, and equanimity. (shrink)

The importance of patients taking an active role in their healthcare is recognized internationally, to improve safety and effectiveness in practice. There is still, however, some ambiguity about the conceptualization of that patient role; it is referred to interchangeably in the literature as engagement, involvement, and participation. The aim of this discussion paper is to examine and conceptualize the concepts of patient engagement, involvement, and participation within healthcare, particularly nursing. The concepts were found to have semantic differences and similarities, although, (...) from a nursing perspective, they can be summoned to illustrate the establishment of a mutual partnership between a patient and a nurse. The individualization of such processes requires the joint effort of engagement, involvement, or participation, represented by interactive actions of both the patient (asking questions, telling/speaking up, knowledge acquisition, learning, and decision‐making) and the nurse (recognizing, responding, information sharing, teaching, and collaborating). Suggesting that the concepts can be used interchangeably comes with some caution, requiring that nurses embrace patients playing a role in their health and healthcare. Further research and practice development should focus on how patients and nurses receive and respond to each other to establish patient engagement, involvement, and participation. (shrink)